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Notes
UNITED STATES v. WHITE: FURTHER UNBALANCING THE
JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF FORCIBLE MEDICATION OF
DEFENDANTS FOUND INCOMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL
CYNTHIA POLASKO*
In United States v. White, 1 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit considered whether the federal government could
force defendant Kimberly White to take antipsychotic medication
against her will for the sole purpose of rendering her competent to
stand trial. 2 The court held that the government could not forcibly
medicate White because its interest in forcible medication was not
important enough to override White’s constitutional liberty interest in
avoiding such medication. 3 In making its decision, the court considered four factors, 4 as set out by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Sell v. United States. 5 In its opinion, however, the Fourth Circuit overcomplicated the Sell analysis by engaging in a conjectural sentencing calculation while at the same time deemphasizing its focus on
White as an individual. 6 The court should have taken this opportunity to apply the four Sell factors in the form of a constitutional balancing test, which would have identified and weighed White’s specific
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developed this Note, and Notes and Comments Editor Jack Blum for his guidance and
support throughout the writing process. Most importantly, she thanks her parents, Edward and Barbara Polasko, for their unwavering encouragement, patience, and love.
1. 620 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2010).
2. Id. at 404–06.
3. Id. at 404–05.
4. Id. at 409–10.
5. 539 U.S. 166 (2003); see also infra Part II.B.2. This Note uses the following phrases
interchangeably: the four Sell factors, the Sell analysis, and the four-factor Sell test.
6. See infra Part IV.D.1.
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liberty interest in avoiding unwanted medication against the government’s interest in prosecuting White for her crimes. 7
I. THE CASE
On March 19, 2008, a grand jury in the Eastern District of North
Carolina indicted Kimberly White on one count of conspiracy to
commit credit card fraud, two counts of aggravated identity theft, and
three counts of credit card fraud and aiding and abetting. 8 White was
detained pursuant to a court order and psychiatrically evaluated to
determine whether she was competent to stand trial. 9 On July 22,
2008, the district court found that White suffered from a mental disease or defect that rendered her incompetent to stand trial, as she was
unable to understand the nature of the proceedings against her and
to assist counsel in her own defense. 10
White was taken to the Federal Medical Center in Carswell, Texas
(“FMC-Carswell”) for evaluation of whether she would be competent
to stand trial in the foreseeable future. 11 Based on her behavior at
FMC-Carswell, doctors diagnosed White with Delusional Disorder,
Grandiose Type. 12 While doctors did not believe that White was dangerous to herself or others if she remained unmedicated, White refused to take any medication, and clinical staff exhausted all possible
nonmedicinal treatments to render White competent. 13
On May 21, 2009, the district court held a hearing pursuant to
Sell v. United States 14 to determine whether the government could forcibly medicate White to render her competent to stand trial. 15 The
7. See infra Part IV.D.2.
8. United States v. White, No. 5:08-CR-81-D-1, 2009 WL 3296096, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Oct.
9, 2009), rev’d, 620 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2010).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at *2. Specifically, White believed that she could create cures for AIDS and
breast cancer out of her food, and as a result hoarded her food in her cell. Id. Because
she was afraid that someone would steal her cures, White refused to allow FMC-Carswell
staff to clean her cell and would not leave her cell to bathe. White, 620 F.3d at 406.
13. White, 2009 WL 3296096, at *2. Because White was nonviolent, and her disorder
did not put her health at risk, doctors did not consider White a candidate for civil commitment. Id.
14. 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
15. White, 2009 WL 3296096, at *2.
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court heard testimony from Dr. Leslie Powers, who testified as to
White’s disorder and her behavior while at FMC-Carswell, and from
Dr. Camille Kempke, who testified as to the possible treatments available to render White competent. 16 In particular, Dr. Kempke provided testimony as to the drugs available to treat White’s condition, the
recommended dosage of each drug, the process for forcibly administering those drugs, and the possible side effects of the suggested medications. 17
After hearing Dr. White’s and Dr. Kempke’s testimony, the district court applied the four-factor Sell test to determine whether the
government could forcibly medicate White. 18 First, the district court
concluded that the government had an important interest in prosecuting White for her serious crimes and that no special circumstances

16. Id. The court recognized Dr. Powers as an expert in clinical and forensic psychology and recognized Dr. Kempke as an expert in psychiatry. Id.
17. Id. at *3. Dr. Kempke identified three drugs she could administer to White that
would treat her disorder: Haldol Decanoate, Prolixin Decanoate or Enanthate, and
Risperdal Consta. Id. She also described the method she would use to forcibly medicate
White: A FMC-Carswell team would enter White’s cell and restrain her before injecting her
with a fifty milligram dose of Haldol Decanoate. Id. This process would repeat every two
to four weeks, and White would always be given the opportunity to take the medication
voluntarily before being restrained. Id. Possible side effects of the recommended drugs
included tardive dyskinesia, extrapyramidal symptoms, agranulocytosis, and increased risk
of diabetes and hyperlipidemia; Dr. Kempke, however, considered these side effects rare
and stated that they could be addressed with other medications. Id. at *3–4. Drs. Powers
and Kempke based their testimony that White could likely be restored to competence with
antipsychotic medication in part on a 2007 study conducted by Dr. Herbel. See White, 620
F.3d at 420 (stating that the only medical research discussed by the doctors during the Sell
hearing was the Herbel study). In the Herbel study, twenty-two men with delusional disorders were forcibly medicated for their disorders, and seventeen of them, or seventy-seven
percent, were restored to competency as a result. Id. at 420–21.
18. White, 2009 WL 3296096, at *5. Pursuant to Sell, the government must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that: (1) there is an important governmental interest at
stake that is not mitigated by special circumstances; (2) forcibly medicating the defendant
will render him competent to stand trial, but that the effect of the medication will not interfere with the defendant’s ability to assist in his own defense; (3) involuntary medication
is necessary to further the government’s interest; and (4) involuntary medication is medically appropriate and in the defendant’s best medical interests in light of his condition.
Sell, 539 U.S. at 180–81. For an in-depth discussion of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Sell, see infra Part II.B.2.
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existed to undermine this interest. 19 The court reached its determination that White was accused of serious crimes because she faced a
statutory maximum of thirty-nine years in prison if convicted. 20 Second, based on Dr. Kempke’s testimony, the district court found that
antipsychotic medication was substantially likely to render White
competent to stand trial without causing serious side effects or impeding White’s ability to assist in her own defense. 21 Third, the district
court determined that White was unlikely to gain competence without
medication, and that less intrusive means of treatment were not viable. 22 Finally, Dr. Kempke’s testimony persuaded the district court
that the proposed medication regimen was medically appropriate for
White based on her particular condition. 23
Because the district court found that the government satisfied
the four-factor Sell test, it granted the government permission to forcibly medicate White so she would regain competence to stand trial. 24
The district court anticipated, however, that White would appeal to
the Fourth Circuit and accordingly stayed the order permitting forcible medication. 25 The Fourth Circuit heard White’s timely interlocutory appeal to determine whether the government demonstrated an
important interest in prosecuting White that would overcome any
showing of special circumstances. 26
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Balancing tests are commonly utilized in constitutional decisions,
especially when federal courts weigh individual constitutional interests against governmental interests. 27 The individual right to be free
from unwanted medical treatments, including unwanted medication
with antipsychotic drugs, is derived from the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitu-

19. Id. at *5–6.
20. White, 2009 WL 3296096, at *5.
21. Id. at *6.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at *5–7. In particular, the district court found that the government satisfied the
test by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
25. Id. at *7.
26. United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401, 404 (4th Cir. 2010).
27. See infra Part II.A.
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tion. 28 When the government wishes to forcibly medicate an individual solely to render him competent to stand trial, the Supreme Court
requires that a court consider four distinct factors, set out in Sell v.
United States. 29 After Sell, lower federal courts, including the Fourth
Circuit, developed their own ways of reviewing and applying the four
factors. 30
A. The Supreme Court Has Successfully Utilized Balancing Tests in
Situations Where an Individual’s Personal Liberty Is Pitted Against
the Government’s Interests
When referring to a balancing opinion, this Note looks to the
definition provided by Professor T. Alexander Aleinikoff: “By a ‘balancing opinion,’ I mean a judicial opinion that analyzes a constitutional question by identifying interests implicated by the case and
reaches a decision or constructs a rule of constitutional law by explicitly or implicitly assigning values to the identified interests.” 31 Specifically, the constitutional balancing test advocated in this Note is an “ad
hoc” balancing test, where “the process that the Constitution requires
is determined by balancing the governmental and private interests at
stake in the particular case.” 32 Such an ad hoc balancing test cannot
be satisfied merely through the application of a multi-factor test, because the two kinds of tests are inherently different: Multi-factor tests
“ask questions about how one ought to characterize particular

28. See infra Part II.A–B.
29. See infra Part II.B.2.
30. See infra Part II.C.
31. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943,
945 (1987).
32. Id. at 948. Professor Aleinikoff contrasted this ad hoc balancing with the concept
of “definitional” balancing. Id. In ad hoc balancing, the act of balancing itself is the constitutional principle, whereas definitional balancing “establishes a substantive constitutional principle of general application . . . .” Id. Because of these conceptual differences, a
definitional balancing opinion produces a holding that can be applied in later, factually
similar cases, without the need to perform the balancing test again; by contrast, an ad hoc
balancing opinion is factually specific, and the balancing must be performed separately
each time the issue arises. Id. Professor Aleinikoff considered the holding in New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), an example of a definitional balancing test, because the holding “that the distribution of child pornography is not protected by the First Amendment . . . may be applied in subsequent cases without additional balancing.” Id. For an
example of an ad hoc balancing test, see infra note 37.
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events,” but balancing tests “focus . . . directly on the interests or factors themselves. Each interest seeks recognition on its own and forces
a head-to-head comparison with competing interests.” 33
The Supreme Court has frequently applied ad hoc balancing
tests in cases that raised a governmental interest on one side and one
of myriad individual constitutional rights on the other. 34 A comprehensive overview of the different kinds of cases in which balancing has
been employed to weigh competing interests is beyond the scope of
this Note. Briefly, however, the Court has employed balancing tests in
cases implicating various individual rights, from the First Amendment
right of free association 35 to the Fourth Amendment protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 36 The Court has also
evaluated the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial through balancing. 37 Similarly, balancing tests have been used in procedural due
process 38 and substantive due process 39 cases.

33. Aleinikoff, supra note 31, at 945. Although Professor Aleinikoff’s definitions provide guidance for the kind of balancing test called for in this Note, he recognized that balancing tests are not without their pitfalls. For example, he noted the difficulties in developing “the scale needed to translate the value of interests into a common currency for
comparison” and recognized that the Supreme Court “spent surprisingly little time exploring the difficult analytic and operational problems the method presents.” Id. at 972–73.
34. See id. at 965–72 (providing examples and analysis of how balancing tests were applied in cases arising from the Bill of Rights). As Professor Aleinikoff noted, while the traditional conception of balancing tests weighs governmental interests against individual interests, balancing was used in other situations as well, including conflicts between two
governmental interests and conflicts where the government is not involved at all. Id. at
947.
35. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959) (balancing the individual’s right to not disclose his membership in the Communist Party with the government’s interest in investigating communist activities within the United States).
36. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1968) (calling for a balancing test in specific types of search situations, where the government can articulate specific facts that warrant an intrusion into individual privacy); see also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209–
10 (1979) (characterizing Terry as setting out a balancing test within a special area of
Fourth Amendment seizures).
37. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530–33 (1972) (setting out an ad hoc balancing test by looking to the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant to determine whether the right to a speedy trial was violated).
38. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332–35 (1976) (setting forth a balancing test, which requires consideration of three factors, to determine whether the govern-
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The Court has applied a balancing test when an individual’s liberty and interest in bodily integrity were at stake. In Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health, 40 for example, the Supreme Court addressed the conflict between the right to refuse life-sustaining medical
treatments and the state’s asserted interests in preserving life. 41 The
right to refuse medical treatment was grounded both in common law
and in the Constitution, specifically in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 42 Forced medical treatment violated the
Fourteenth Amendment by impinging upon the individual’s liberty
interest in his own body. 43 The Court then endorsed a balancing test
in the context of refusing life-saving medical treatment when it stated:
“[D]etermining that a person has a ‘liberty interest’ under the Due
Process Clause does not end the inquiry; ‘whether respondent’s constitutional rights have been violated must be determined by balancing
his liberty interests against the relevant state interests.’” 44 To overcome the individual’s interest in not being forcibly subjected to medical treatment, the state needed to prove its interest by clear and convincing evidence. 45 This particular standard of proof was adopted

ment was required to provide a hearing pursuant to the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause before terminating Social Security benefits).
39. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319–21 (1982) (finding that the Court
must balance individual liberty against “‘the demands of an organized society’” in determining whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was violated (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting))).
40. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
41. Id. at 270.
42. Id. at 271, 278; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). This constitutional
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment was inferred in part from the Court’s decision in the same term in Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). Cruzan, 497 U.S. at
278. For a discussion of the importance of Harper, see infra Part II.B.
43. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287–88 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 279 (majority opinion) (citation omitted) (quoting Youngberg, 457 U.S. at
321). The Court identified the state interest in this case as the interest in protecting and
preserving human life. Id. at 280.
45. See id. at 282 (approving Missouri’s use of the clear and convincing evidence standard by noting that “[t]his Court has mandated an intermediate standard of proof—‘clear
and convincing evidence’—when the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are
both ‘particularly important’ and ‘more substantial than mere loss of money” (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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because the individual and the state interests were seen as “particularly important” and “substantial.” 46
B. The Supreme Court Has Recognized an Individual’s Constitutionally
Protected Liberty Interest in Not Being Forcibly Medicated and
Extended That Right to Defendants Who Were Found Incompetent to
Stand Trial
The Supreme Court has considered state-sanctioned forcible
medication in the context of criminal prosecution in a series of cases,
each of which focused on a narrowly tailored group of individuals. 47
These decisions recognized an individual liberty interest on the one
hand and a governmental interest on the other, but the Court never
explicitly weighed these interests against each other. 48 In its most recent decision on the issue of forcible medication, the Court set out
four factors that lower federal courts must consider when faced with a
government request to forcibly medicate defendants who would otherwise be incompetent to stand trial. 49
1. The Supreme Court Has Provided Constitutional Protections for
Individuals Who Do Not Wish to Take Antipsychotic Medications
In Washington v. Harper, 50 the Supreme Court addressed whether
Walter Harper, a mentally ill prisoner serving a sentence in a state
prison, could be forcibly treated with antipsychotic medication against
his will. 51 The Court analyzed Harper’s desire to refuse medication in
the context of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend46. Id. at 282–83. In Cruzan, the majority determined that Cruzan’s parents did not
prove by clear and convincing evidence that their daughter wished to have hydration and
nutrition withdrawn in the event that she entered a persistent vegetative state. Id. at 284–
85. Due to that lack of evidence, Missouri was not required to defer to the parents’ wishes
and was allowed to continue Cruzan’s life support. Id. at 286–87.
47. See infra Part II.B.1–2.
48. See infra Part II.B.1–2.
49. See infra Part II.B.2.
50. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
51. Id. at 213. Harper was originally convicted of robbery and eventually had his parole revoked after he assaulted two nurses in a Seattle hospital. Id. at 213–14. Although
Harper had voluntarily taken antipsychotic medication during his original incarceration,
upon his return to prison he refused to continue taking medication for manic-depressive
disorder. Id. A prison physician sought to forcibly medicate Harper pursuant to the state
of Washington’s special offender policy. Id. at 214.
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ment. 52 Specifically, the majority articulated the individual’s “significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs.” 53 The Due Process Clause was implicated in such
situations because “[t]he forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting person’s body represents a substantial interference with
that person’s liberty” under the Fourteenth Amendment. 54 With this
articulation of the individual’s interest, the Court found that Harper
could be forcibly medicated because Washington’s policy satisfied the
procedural and substantive demands imposed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 55
The Supreme Court again addressed the forcible medication of
criminal defendants in Riggins v. Nevada, 56 this time in the context of
a defendant, David Riggins, who claimed he was forcibly medicated
with an antipsychotic drug during the course of his trial. 57 The Court
reaffirmed its finding in Harper that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
52. Id. at 213.
53. Id. at 221.
54. Id. at 229.
55. Id. at 220, 222–23. The Court articulated that the substantive due process issue
concerned “what factual circumstances must exist before the State [of Washington] may
administer antipsychotic drugs to [Harper] against his will,” and the procedural due process aspect concerned whether “the State’s nonjudicial mechanisms used to determine the
facts in a particular case are sufficient.” Id. at 220. Stated more generally, “‘[t]he substantive issue involves a definition of th[e] protected Constitutional interest, as well as identification of the conditions under which competing state interests might outweigh it. The
procedural issue concerns the minimum procedures required by the Constitution for determining that the individual’s liberty interest actually is outweighed in a particular instance.’” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299
(1982)).

The Court also recognized that the prison environment presented its own

unique set of concerns that affected the substantive due process requirements the State of
Washington had to satisfy before medication would be allowed. Id. at 227.
56. 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
57. Id. at 129. A jury convicted Riggins of murder and robbery, both with the use of a
deadly weapon. Id. at 131. During his trial, Riggins moved the Clark County District Court
for an order suspending the forced administration of two antipsychotic medications, but
his motion was denied. Id. at 130–31. Although the district court did not offer any rationale for its decision, it presumably relied in part on oral testimony from three psychiatrists. See id. (describing the testimony of Drs. Master, Quass, and O’Gorman). Riggins
appealed his convictions, arguing in part that the forced administration of medication
during his trial deprived him of his constitutional rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Id. at 132–33.
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Due Process Clause granted an individual a protected liberty interest
in refusing forcible medication, and reiterated that that liberty interest is particularly pronounced when the drugs are of the antipsychotic
variety. 58 The Riggins Court also recognized that individuals whom
the state detains for trial retain constitutional rights 59 and, as a result,
the State of Nevada was required under the Fourteenth Amendment
“to establish the need for [a particular antipsychotic] and the medical
appropriateness of the drug” before forcing Riggins to continue taking antipsychotics during his trial. 60 Although the Court declined to
lay out specific substantive standards for the Nevada court to consider
on remand, it reasoned that the state would have satisfied due process
had it demonstrated both the medical appropriateness of forced medication and the need, in the absence of alternative treatments, for
medication to ensure the safety of Riggins and others around him. 61
2. The Supreme Court Extended Constitutional Protections Against
Forcibly Medicating Defendants Who Would Otherwise Be
Incompetent to Stand Trial by Establishing a Four-Factor Test
In Sell v. United States, 62 defendant Charles Sell, who had been
found mentally incompetent to stand trial, opposed the government’s
motion to involuntarily medicate him on the grounds that forcible

58. Id. at 133–34. The Court took particular notice of the effect of antipsychotic drugs
on an individual’s liberty interest because “[t]he purpose of the drugs is to alter the chemical balance in a patient’s brain, leading to changes . . . in his or her cognitive processes.
While the therapeutic benefits of antipsychotic drugs are well documented, it is also true
that the drugs can have serious, even fatal, side effects.” Harper, 494 U.S. at 229.
59. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135. Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, explicitly noted that this case was different from Harper, where medication was ordered to render Harper not dangerous to himself or those around him, because it focused on forcible medication simply for the purposes of rendering Riggins competent to stand trial. Id. at 140
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 135 (majority opinion). In the absence of such findings, the Court found
that Riggins’ constitutional trial rights were impaired, and ordered that the judgment of
the Nevada Supreme Court be reversed. Id. at 137–38.
61. Id. at 135. The Court noted that the ultimate problem in Riggins was that the district court allowed forcible medication in the absence of any sort of findings regarding
medical appropriateness, reasonable alternatives, safety, or other compelling considerations. Id. at 136.
62. 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
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medication deprived him of his constitutional liberty guaranties. 63
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the forcible administration of antipsychotic medication for the sole purpose
of rendering Sell competent to stand trial deprived him of the constitutional liberty to reject unwanted medical treatment. 64 According to
the Court, the government could forcibly medicate Sell for the sole
purpose of rendering him competent to stand trial, but only in limited circumstances and “upon [the] satisfaction of [certain] conditions.” 65
Looking to its previous decisions in Harper and Riggins, the Court
found that the Constitution’s liberty protections logically extended to
defendants whom the government wished to medicate in order to
render them competent to stand trial. 66 The government could, however, override that constitutional liberty interest “only if the treatment
is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects
that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking account of
less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further important governmental trial-related interests.” 67 The Court intended
this standard to provide guidance for forcible medication in competency cases, but still noted that forcible medication may be allowed
only in rare cases. 68
63. Id. at 171, 175. Sell, described as a man with “a long and unfortunate history of
mental illness,” was charged with attempted murder and several nonviolent offenses, including insurance fraud, mail fraud, Medicaid fraud, and money laundering. Id. at 169–
70. Sell was found incompetent to stand trial after hospitalization and treatment at the
United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners. Id. at 170–71. He refused to take the
prescribed antipsychotic medications that would allegedly render him competent. Id. at
171. A federal magistrate judge and the reviewing district court both ruled in favor of the
government’s motion for forcible medication, although the district court disagreed with
the magistrate’s finding that Sell was dangerous and needed to be medicated for his own
safety and the safety of others. Id. at 173–74.
64. Id. at 177. The Court in Sell framed Sell’s liberty in terms of the Fifth Amendment’s protections of due process, and did not frame the issue in Fourteenth Amendment
terms. Id. The Court explicitly noted, however, that its earlier decisions in Harper and Riggins guided its inquiry into the individual liberty issue. Id. at 178–79. As discussed above,
Harper and Riggins framed the individual liberty interest in Fourteenth Amendment terms.
See supra Part II.B.1.
65. Sell, 539 U.S. at 169.
66. Id. at 179.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 180.
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The Sell Court broke down the required showing for forcible
medication into four individual factors. 69 First, a court “must find
that important governmental interests are at stake,” which can be satisfied by a showing that the defendant was accused of a “serious”
crime. 70 Those important governmental interests, however, may be
lessened by certain “[s]pecial circumstances.” 71 Such special circumstances include the possibility that the defendant might be confined
to an institution or the possibility that the defendant might receive
credit toward his sentence for time already served in confinement. 72
Second, a court must consider whether “involuntary medication will
significantly further those concomitant state interests.” 73 To make this
finding, the court must determine whether the antipsychotic drugs
are “substantially likely to render the defendant competent,” while at
the same time finding that the drugs chosen are “substantially unlikely to have side effects” that would prevent the defendant from receiving a fair trial. 74 Third, a court must consider whether “involuntary
medication is necessary to further those [governmental] interests.” 75
Under this factor, the court must determine “that any alternative, less
intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially the same results” that could be achieved through medication. 76 Finally, the court
must find that the “administration of the drugs [would be] medically
appropriate, i.e., in the patient’s best medical interest in light of his
medical condition.” 77
These four factors were designed to help lower federal courts determine whether the government had an interest important enough
to override the individual’s interest in not being forcibly medicated
for competency purposes. 78 The Court believed these four factors

69. Id. at 180–81.
70. Id. at 180. The Court noted that for purposes of the forcible medication analysis,
such a “serious” crime could be committed against either a person or property. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 181.
74. Id. A defendant suffering from significant side effects might be unable to assist
counsel in his own defense, resulting in a trial that is constitutionally unfair. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id. (“[T]he court applying these standards is seeking to determine whether involuntary administration of drugs is necessary significantly to further a particular govern-
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“should help [a court] make the ultimate constitutionally required
judgment.” 79 Specifically, the applying court should ask: Has “the
Government, in light of the efficacy, the side effects, the possible alternatives, and the medical appropriateness of a particular course of
antipsychotic drug treatment, shown a need for that treatment sufficiently important to overcome the individual’s protected interest in
refusing it?” 80
C. The Supreme Court Has Provided Lower Federal Courts with Little
Guidance as to How the Four Sell Factors Should Be Applied and
Analyzed in Practice
Although the Sell decision defined the four factors explicitly, 81
the Supreme Court did not take the opportunity to apply those factors to Sell’s particular case, choosing instead to remand the case for
further consideration in light of the new holding. 82 In remanding,
the Court did not address either the evidentiary standard or the
standard of appellate review that should be applied in Sell-type cases. 83
Lower federal courts were therefore left to their own judgment in
making such determinations and often looked to sister circuit courts
for guidance. 84 The Fourth Circuit became a leading force in clarifying the Sell analysis. 85

mental interest, namely, the interest in rendering the defendant competent to stand trial.”).
The Court remarked that lower courts should not engage in an analysis of whether forcible medication for competency purposes would be appropriate if forcible medication
could be warranted for a different reason; for example, if an individual could be forcibly
medicated under Harper’s dangerousness analysis, the court would not have to reach the
competency inquiry. Id. at 181–82.
79. Id. at 183.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 180–81.
82. See id. at 185–86 (providing a brief overview of how the district court touched upon
the four Sell factors, but not applying the factors, and remanding the case).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107, 1113 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting that
“[t]he Supreme Court in Sell articulated neither a standard of proof for the Sell factors nor
a standard of appellate review”).
84. See infra Part II.C.1.
85. See infra Part II.C.2.
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1. The United States Circuit Courts of Appeals Generally Agree on the
Evidentiary and Appellate Review Standards for Sell-Type Cases
Because the Supreme Court did not provide evidentiary or appellate review standards, the lower federal courts were compelled to
make their own choices; still, the federal circuits are now, by and
large, in agreement about the appropriate standards. The Second
Circuit was the first circuit court to hear a Sell-type case when it heard
United States v. Gomes, 86 and it developed the standards that most circuits later adopted. In Gomes, the Second Circuit adopted the clear
and convincing standard of proof for all the Sell factors, based in part
on the Supreme Court’s language in Riggins. 87 Turning to the standards of appellate review, the Second Circuit reasoned that the government’s asserted interest in prosecution was a legal finding and reviewed it de novo, while the court considered the other three Sell
factors “factual in nature” and therefore reviewed them for clear error. 88
When addressing the standards of proof and appellate review,
other courts looked initially to Gomes, and nearly all adopted the same
standards. 89 To this point, a number of circuits have adopted the

86. 387 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2004).
87. Id. at 160. In making this evidentiary determination, the Gomes court likely focused
on the language in Riggins v. Nevada that characterized the “administration of antipsychotic medication [as] necessary to accomplish an essential state policy . . . .” 504 U.S. 127, 138
(1992). The Supreme Court in Washington v. Harper also called for “clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence” before allowing forcible medication. 494 U.S. 210, 228 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. Gomes, 387 F.3d at 160.
89. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 236, 240 (4th Cir. 2005) (looking to
Gomes in developing its review standards); United States v. Fazio, 599 F.3d 835, 839–40 &
n.2 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 901 (2011) (suggesting the use of the clear and
convincing standard of proof at a Sell hearing and adopting explicitly de novo review of the
governmental interest factor and clear error review of the other three factors); United
States v. Green, 532 F.3d 538, 545–46, 551–52, 559 (6th Cir. 2008) (employing de novo review of the governmental interest factor, adopting clear error review of at least two other
Sell factors, and endorsing the clear and convincing standard of proof for all the Sell factors); United States v. Grape, 549 F.3d 591, 598–99 (3d Cir. 2008) (adopting de novo review
of the first Sell factor, clear error review of the second Sell factor, and the clear and convincing standard of proof for the second, third, and fourth Sell factors); United States v.
Hernandez-Vasquez, 513 F.3d 908, 915–16 (9th Cir. 2007) (using de novo review of the first
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clear and convincing evidence standard. 90 There is, however, a slight
discrepancy in the appellate standard of review; the Tenth Circuit reviews the first and second Sell factors de novo and reviews only the
third and fourth factors for clear error. 91 The Tenth Circuit is thus
far the only circuit to review the Sell factors this way, and all other circuits that have addressed the issue generally follow Gomes.
2. The Fourth Circuit Has Emerged as a Leading Force as Lower
Federal Courts Attempted to Further Define How the Government
Should Satisfy Each Sell Factor
The Fourth Circuit was one of several circuit courts to address
the application of the Sell factors multiple times. 92 The court first applied the four Sell factors in United States v. Evans. 93 It remanded the
case to the district court for further proceedings after finding that the
government did not adequately show that its proposed medication regime was “medically appropriate” for Evans or would “significantly

Sell factor and clear error review of the remaining Sell factors); United States v. Palmer, 507
F.3d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 2007) (adopting the appellate standard of review set out in Gomes).
90. The First Circuit and the Seventh Circuit have yet to address the application of the
Sell factors.
91. See United States v. Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107, 1113–14 (10th Cir. 2005) (agreeing
with the Gomes court that the governmental interest factor should be viewed as a question
of law, but “expand[ing] the parameters of the legal question” to include the second factor as well).
92. The Ninth Circuit addressed the issue three times.

See United States v. Ruiz-

Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Hernandez-Vasquez, 513 F.3d 908
(9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Rivera-Guerrero, 426 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2005). The
Tenth Circuit also addressed the Sell issue repeatedly. See United States v. ValenzuelaPuentes, 479 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir.
2005); United States v. Morrison, 415 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 2005). Other circuits, however,
only addressed the issue once. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 630 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir.
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 128 (2011); United States v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157 (2d Cir.
2004).
93. 404 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2005). Defendant Herbert Evans was accused of assault on a
federal employee and of threatening to murder a federal judge but was found mentally
incompetent to stand trial because he was diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic. Id. at
232. After Evans refused treatment, the government moved, pursuant to Sell, to forcibly
medicate him to render him competent for trial. Id. The United States District Court for
the Western District of Virginia granted the motion after applying Sell’s four-part test, and
Evans appealed. Id. at 227, 232, 235.
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further” its interest in prosecuting. 94 The Evans court characterized
the Sell holding overall as “a four-part showing” that the government
must make to ensure it complied with the Constitution in seeking the
forcible medication of an incompetent defendant. 95 This four-part
showing allowed the government to constitutionally “outweigh the defendant’s liberty interest” in refusing medication. 96 The Fourth Circuit then examined three of the four Sell factors and articulated the
standards the government would be held to in a Sell-style case. 97
In applying the first Sell factor—whether the government had an
important interest—the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s
conclusion de novo. 98 Specifically, to determine whether Evans was
facing prosecution for a “serious” offense, the Fourth Circuit “focus[ed] on the maximum penalty authorized by statute,” and argued
that such a focus “respects legislative judgments regarding the severity
of the crime.” 99 While it declined to specify a rule as to what statutory
maximum would constitute a “serious” crime, the Fourth Circuit conceded that an important governmental interest exists when the defendant faces a maximum punishment of ten years or more. 100 This
important governmental interest was not mitigated by any of the special circumstances discussed in Sell. 101
94. Id. at 232.
95. Id. at 235.
96. Id.
97. The Fourth Circuit only addressed the first, second, and fourth Sell factors because
Evans did not challenge the question of whether the government satisfied the third factor.
Id. at 236 & n.4.
98. Id. at 236. In choosing to review this factor as a matter of law, the Fourth Circuit
followed the majority of other circuits. See supra Part II.C.1.
99. Evans, 404 F.3d at 237. Notably, the Fourth Circuit explicitly rejected Evans’s argument that the “proper focus” in determining whether he was facing prosecution for a serious crime “should be on the sentence he was most likely to receive under the Sentencing
Guidelines.” Id. While the Fourth Circuit admitted that a probable sentencing guideline
range would show respect to legislative judgment about serious crimes, it rejected Evans’s
argument on the grounds that looking to the guidelines “would simply be unworkable because at this stage in the proceedings, there is no way of accurately predicting what that
range will be.” Id. at 237–38.
100. Id. at 238.
101. Id. at 239. Specifically, the Fourth Circuit recognized that Evans was unlikely to be
civilly committed. Id. Additionally, although Evans was incarcerated for over two years
while awaiting trial, the court noted that “while the length of Evans’s confinement for
evaluation may lessen the importance of the state’s interest, it does not defeat it.” Id.
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Considering them findings of fact, the Fourth Circuit reviewed
the district court’s findings on the second and fourth Sell factors for
clear error. 102 The court held that the government did not supply adequate information to satisfy the factors in question. 103 The primary
failing, as related to the “significantly further” and “medically appropriate” factors, was that the involuntarily medicated report (“IM report”) filed in the lower court proceedings failed to identify which antipsychotic drugs doctors planned to use to restore Evans to
competency. 104 The Fourth Circuit specifically stated that to establish
the medical appropriateness of its forcible medication request, “[t]he
government must propose a course of treatment in which it specifies
the particular drug to be administered.” 105 The IM report’s failure to
address the possible side effects of any specific drugs contributed to
the government’s failure to satisfy the “medically appropriate” Sell factor. 106 In short, “[w]ithout at least describing the proposed course of
treatment, it is tautological that the Government cannot satisfy its
burden of showing anything with regards to that treatment, much less
that it will ‘significantly further’ the Government’s trial-related interests and be ‘medically appropriate’ for Evans.” 107
The government’s second major stumbling block regarding the
second and fourth factors was the IM report’s failure to analyze Evans
as an individual. 108 Nothing in the IM report explained how antipsychotic medication would be appropriate for Evans’ specific physiology. 109 Instead, the IM report “simply set[] up syllogisms to explain its
102. Id. at 240.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 233, 240.
105. Id. at 240. The IM report filed in support of the government’s motion only referenced second-generation, or atypical, antipsychotic medications but mentioned none by
name. Id. at 233. The report filed in support of forcible medication also did not discuss
the rationale behind the doctors’ conclusions that medication would render Evans competent. Id. at 233–34.
106. Id. at 240.
107. Id. For a discussion of how the Fourth Circuit analyzed the second and fourth Sell
factors as parts of a single unit, as opposed to individual factors to be established independently, see infra Part IV.C.
108. Evans, 404 F.3d at 240–41.
109. Id. at 240. For example, the IM report “nowhere addressed [a psychiatrist’s] concern that Evans’s delusions of governmental conspiracies that have persisted longer than
40 years will resist involuntary medication precisely because the government administers
the medication.” Id. at 241. The IM report also did not address how Evans, “an elderly
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conclusions” that, if accepted in this case, would have allowed the
government to satisfy the second and fourth Sell factors by asserting
that antipsychotics were generally effective and medically appropriate
for most people. 110 Thus, to satisfy the second and fourth Sell factors
in the Fourth Circuit, the government must describe its proposed
treatment plan and all other relevant circumstances as they relate to
the specific facts of an individual case. 111
The Fourth Circuit once again addressed the Sell factors in United
States v. Bush. 112 In that case, the court explicitly adopted the clear
and convincing evidence standard when considering cases under Sell,
and remanded the case to the district court on the grounds that the
government did not provide enough evidence to satisfy the demanding second and fourth factors. 113 The court also revisited the first factor and any potentially undermining special circumstances but upheld the district court’s finding that the government had an

man with diabetes, hypertension, and asthma,” might experience any potential side effects
of antipsychotic medication. Id.
110. Id. at 241.
111. Id. at 242. Any report filed in support of the second and fourth Sell factors in the
Fourth Circuit must therefore discuss any potential side effects as they relate to a particular defendant, describe a plan to deal with those potential side effects, and explain why
those side effects are “substantially unlikely” to interfere with the defendant’s ability to assist counsel in preparing his defense. Id. The report must also “provide the estimated
time the proposed treatment plan will take to restore the defendant’s competence and the
criteria it will apply when deciding when to discontinue the treatment,” and explain why
medication is overall more beneficial to the defendant than refusing the medication would
be. Id. This is a more stringent standard than that adopted in other circuits. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107, 1114–15 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding that the government met its burden by clear and convincing evidence that its proposed treatment was
medically appropriate, even though the testifying doctor spoke in general about antipsychotic medications).
112. 585 F.3d 806 (4th Cir. 2009). Defendant Barbara Bush, who suffered from Delusional Disorder, Persecutory Type, was charged with threatening a federal judge but was
found mentally incompetent to stand trial. Id. at 809. Because psychiatrists believed she
could be restored to competence with antipsychotics, the government sought to forcibly
medicate Bush after she refused treatment. Id. The United States District Court for the
District of Maryland granted the government’s motion. Id. at 806, 809.
113. Id. at 809, 814, 817–18.
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important interest that was not mitigated. 114 In affirming the district
court’s finding that no special circumstances existed, the court stated
that “[e]ven though Bush can make a serious argument that the time
she has already served in prison is sufficiently long to cover, or almost
cover, any sentence that reasonably could be anticipated, this fact
alone does not defeat [the government’s interest].” 115
The Fourth Circuit, however, found that the government failed
to meet the evidentiary burden to show that forcible medication
would be substantially likely to render Bush competent while also being in her best medical interest. 116 The court again emphasized that
the government must demonstrate how a specific medication is likely
to work on a specific defendant. 117 Because the Evans decision, which
set out this individualized analysis, failed to establish a corresponding
evidentiary standard, the Bush district court allowed medication under the second Sell factor without the appropriate amount of evidence
needed to satisfy the newly adopted clear and convincing evidence
standard. 118 The district court also failed to address whether medication would be in Bush’s best medical interest, even though reports
filed in support of Bush’s forcible medication did not specify a specific drug, a specific dosage, or a specific plan to deal with side effects. 119
In so deciding, the district court contravened both the holding in Evans and the new evidentiary standard adopted by the Fourth Circuit. 120

114. Id. at 814–15. Bush acknowledged that her charged crimes carried a ten-year maximum. Id. at 814. Yet, based on the Sentencing Guidelines and governmental concessions, she argued she would only be sentenced to time served. Id.
115. Id. at 815 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. Id. at 815–18.
117. Id. at 816. In this case, Bush’s particular psychotic disorder presented some uncertainty as to whether medication could reverse her condition. Id. This uncertainty was included in the record through the testimony of two different doctors, each with a different
opinion as to the potential success of antipsychotics on Bush. Id.
118. Id. at 816–17.
119. Id. at 817.
120. Id. at 817–18. Admittedly, the report in Bush was more specific than the report in
Evans. The government identified three specific medications that were being considered,
even indicating a preference for one drug above the other two, and they provided a plan
for forcible injection every two weeks. Id. at 817. No dosages, however, were provided in
the reports, and the district court “did not guide or limit the medical staff’s discretion” as
to dosages. Id. The proposed forcible medication plan also failed to account for Bush’s
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The Fourth Circuit’s application of the Sell factors influenced the
forcible medication analysis in other circuits. For example, the Eleventh Circuit implicitly adopted the finding in Evans that the government should submit a personalized treatment plan with dosages and
possible side effects when arguing that its medication regime is substantially likely to render the defendant competent. 121 The Ninth Circuit also explicitly adopted the reasoning in Evans when it found that
a Sell analysis would not be satisfied if the government simply drew
“direct inference[s]” that forcible medication would render a specific
defendant competent from “general proposition[s]” that antipsychotic medications were usually effective. 122 In that same decision, the
Ninth Circuit also cited Bush when noting “the weakness of evidence
that antipsychotic medication is successful in treating Delusional Disorder.” 123 Similarly, both the Ninth and the Tenth Circuits looked to
Evans when determining what constituted a “serious crime” in the Sell
analysis, although only one of those circuits agreed with the Fourth
Circuit’s analysis. 124 These cases suggest that the Fourth Circuit’s application and understanding of the Sell factors significantly influenced
other appellate courts and that the court is a leader in this area of the
law.
diabetes and for how any side effects might affect that condition, an omission that went
against the holding in Evans. Id. at 817–18.
121. See United States v. Diaz, 630 F.3d 1314, 1334 (11th Cir. 2011), cert denied, 132 S. Ct.
128 (2011) (noting with approval the testifying doctor’s personalized medication plan and
contrasting that plan to Evans, where no specific dosage plan was submitted).
122. United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684, 700 (9th Cir. 2010). The Ninth Circuit
cited extensively to Evans and noted that, “[l]ike the Fourth Circuit, ‘[w]e do not believe
that Sell’s analysis permits such deference.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d
227, 241 (4th Cir. 2005)).
123. Id. at 701 n.11.
124. Compare United States v. Hernandez-Vasquez, 513 F.3d 908, 918–19 (9th Cir. 2007)
(discussing the Fourth Circuit’s analysis in Evans, but ultimately “disagree[ing] with the
Fourth Circuit and conclud[ing] that the likely guideline range is the appropriate starting
point for the analysis of a crime’s seriousness”), with United States v. Valenzuela-Puentes,
479 F.3d 1220, 1226 (10th Cir. 2007) (agreeing with the Evans court that the seriousness of
a crime “relates to the possible penalty the defendant faces if convicted, as well as the nature or effect of the underlying conduct for which he was charged”). Other circuits have
cited Evans when determining the seriousness of an offense. See, e.g., United States v.
Green, 532 F.3d 538, 547 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Evans and considering “both the potential
statutory penalty and the potential Guideline range” to determine the seriousness of a
crime).
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III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In United States v. White, the Fourth Circuit held that the government could not forcibly medicate Kimberly White for the sole purpose of rendering her competent to stand trial. 125 Writing for the majority, Judge Davis reasoned that the government did not show a
sufficiently important interest in prosecuting White that would override her constitutionally protected liberty interest in not being forcibly medicated. 126
Judge Davis reiterated that the four-factor Sell test governed the
conflict between the government’s interest in prosecuting crime and
the defendant’s liberty interest in not being forcibly medicated for
the purpose of being made competent to stand trial. 127 Considering
the first Sell factor, Judge Davis weighed the government’s interest in
prosecuting White against any special circumstances that might mitigate that interest. 128 He deemed this factor dispositive and found that
the government’s interest did not overcome the special circumstances
present in White’s case. 129 In determining whether special circumstances undermined the government’s interest in prosecuting White,
Judge Davis considered: the amount of time White spent, and would
likely spend, in confinement before her trial could begin; the nature
of her crime; the fact that her confinement would preclude her from
certain activities that would threaten public safety; her unique medical condition; and whether the case against White was sufficiently exceptional to allow the government to forcibly medicate her. 130
After considering how much time White spent in confinement,
and determining what her sentence might be if convicted, Judge Da125. 620 F.3d 401, 410, 422 (4th Cir. 2010).
126. Id. at 404, 410.
127. Id. at 409–10; see also supra note 18 (discussing the four-factor Sell test).
128. White, 620 F.3d at 410.
129. Id. Although Judge Davis recognized that White’s charged crimes were serious, he
noted that the government’s interest in prosecuting even serious crimes can be mitigated
when special circumstances are present. Id. at 411. The Fourth Circuit considers crimes
serious when the defendant faces a maximum sentence of ten years in prison. Id. at 410.
130. Id. at 413. When the Fourth Circuit previously considered the issue of special circumstances in involuntary medication cases, it examined: “(1) the possibility that the defendant might be confined to an institution for the mentally ill . . . ; (2) the potential for
future confinement should the defendant regain competence; and (3) the fact that the
defendant . . . [might] receive credit toward any sentence imposed [for time served].” Id.
at 411 n.8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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vis found that White’s time in pretrial detention would “have extended considerably longer than her likely sentence,” a fact that substantially
weakened the government’s interest in prosecuting White. 131 In making this determination, Judge Davis estimated that White’s likely prison sentence would range between forty-two and fifty-one months,
based in part on the sentence imposed on White’s codefendant and
the median and mean sentences that local and national courts had
imposed on other defendants charged with similar crimes. 132 Although the estimation that White already served a significant portion
of her likely sentence substantially weakened the government’s interest in prosecuting her, Judge Davis indicated that White needed to
show additional special circumstances to completely mitigate the government’s interest. 133 Noting that “[n]ot every serious crime is equally serious,” the majority emphasized that White’s crimes were nonvioThis
lent and committed against property, not people. 134

131. Id. at 418–19. Judge Davis noted that from the time of her arrest in March 2007 to
the time her appeal was heard in August 2010, White was already confined for forty-one
months. Id. at 414. He estimated that if White was forcibly medicated, she would spend
an additional four months in detention before regaining competence to stand trial, resulting in forty-five months in confinement before her trial could begin. Id. If White chose to
appeal an unfavorable decision to the Supreme Court, she would spend at least another
six months in confinement while waiting for her petition for certiorari to be granted or
denied, resulting in fifty-one months of confinement before her trial could begin. Id. If
White was brought to trial and found guilty, she would be awarded approximately 6.7
months of good conduct credits, resulting in 57.7 months of confinement. Id. at 415.
132. Id. at 415–18. Judge Davis noted that the court also could have calculated White’s
likely sentence based on the federal advisory sentencing guidelines, but that the court
could look to codefendants and national average sentences if it could not find the appropriate sentencing guidelines. Id. at 415. In coming to his anticipated sentence of forty-two
to fifty-one months, Judge Davis noted that White’s codefendant, Vonda Machelle Baker,
received a thirty-six-month sentence “for substantially the same relevant conduct in which
White [was] alleged to have engaged.” Id. at 416, 418. He also considered that, nationally,
defendants convicted of fraud tended to serve no prison time and that the Fourth Circuit
tended to issue nonprison sentences for fraud. Id. at 416–17. Finally, Judge Davis referred
to data from the United States Sentencing Commission and noted that the median sentence for fraud charges was eighteen months. Id. at 417.
133. Id. at 419.
134. Id.
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distinguished White’s case from Evans and Bush. 135 Judge Davis reasoned that White’s confinement in a mental hospital would prevent
her from ever owning a handgun, thus addressing the concern that
White could be a danger to the public without prosecution. 136 He also noted that White’s medical condition made it difficult to predict
with certainty whether she could be restored to competence and
what, if any, side effects she would experience as a result of involuntary medication. 137 Finally, Judge Davis concluded that White’s crimes
were “not sufficiently exceptional” and that allowing forcible medication in her case would risk making forcible medication to restore
competency a “routine” practice. 138
Judge Keenan wrote a concurring opinion, emphasizing that the
government must show an “overriding” or “essential” interest in prosecuting a defendant before forcible medication can be allowed. 139
She reasoned that the government failed to meet that burden in
White’s case. 140 Although Judge Keenan did not estimate what
White’s likely prison sentence might be if she was convicted, she recognized that White had been in custody for forty-one months, a “significant period of time.” 141 She also noted that White’s crimes were
“entirely nonviolent” and that, although they were serious, the charges were not exceptional enough to justify forcible medication. 142

135. Id.; see also supra Part II.C.2 (discussing United States v. Evans and United States v.
Bush). The majority also noted that prosecuting White would not provide her victims with
any tangible benefit. White, 620 F.3d at 419.
136. Id. at 420.
137. Id. at 420–21. The majority distinguished between White’s diagnosis of Delusional
Disorder, Grandiose Type and the diagnoses of patients in the Herbel study cited by Drs.
Kempke and Powers. Id. In the Herbel study, only one of the twenty-two subjects had Delusional Disorder, Grandiose Type, and none of the subjects were female. Id. at 421. The
majority therefore reasoned that the Herbel study outcome did not accurately predict how
White would respond to similar medication. Id. at 420–21. Judge Davis also gave less
weight to Dr. Kempke’s testimony regarding how White might respond to the recommended medication because her expertise was in schizophrenia, not delusional disorders,
and she never personally examined White. Id. at 421.
138. Id. at 421–22.
139. Id. at 422 (Keenan, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 422.
141. Id. at 423.
142. Id.
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In dissent, Judge Niemeyer asserted that the district court “careful[ly]” and “thorough[ly]” reviewed and applied the four-factor Sell
test in allowing White to be forcibly medicated. 143 He believed that
the Fourth Circuit should have deferred to the district court’s findings. 144 Judge Niemeyer characterized the majority’s assessment of
White’s likely sentence as “rank speculation” and stated that the court
had conducted an “unprecedented and unsupportable” sentencing
hearing without the benefit of a presentence report or the necessary
facts. 145 Taking issue with the majority’s conclusion that the nonviolent nature of White’s offenses reduced the seriousness of her crimes,
Judge Niemeyer argued that the Supreme Court in Sell did not distinguish between crimes committed against a person and those against
property. 146 Judge Niemeyer finally noted that a trial would have
permitted the government to publicly confront White with the allegations against her, which could serve as a deterrent to others who
might commit similar crimes, and that a criminal conviction would
have allowed the government to fully punish White for her crimes by
subjecting her to a period of supervised release and requiring her to
pay restitution to her victims. 147
IV. ANALYSIS
In United States v. White, the Fourth Circuit missed an opportunity
to apply the four Sell factors as elements of a constitutional balancing
test, choosing instead to complicate the Sell inquiry by performing a
conjectural sentencing analysis. A balancing test would have support-

143. Id. at 424 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 424, 428. A sentencing judge would ordinarily consider a presentence report
that includes White’s criminal history and definitions of the relevant conduct of the
charged crimes. Id. In a sentencing hearing, the government would be permitted to introduce evidence of White’s criminal conduct that was not included in the indictment and
other evidence that might justify enhancing White’s sentence. Id. Judge Niemeyer disapproved of the majority’s failure to address the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in estimating
White’s probable sentence and noted that White’s coconspirator had been cooperative
and had only faced two counts in contrast to White’s six. Id. Judge Niemeyer also stressed
that courts of appeals cannot conduct sentencing proceedings and criminal sentences
cannot be based on national averages for a broad class of fraud charges. Id. at 429.
146. Id. at 430.
147. Id.
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ed an individually focused analysis148 and should have been applied in
a situation such as White’s, where individual liberty rights conflicted
with governmental interests. 149 Earlier Supreme Court decisions, including Sell, set out the importance of individual interests in forcible
medication cases and suggested that a balancing-style test could be
appropriately applied. 150 Other lower federal courts conducted Sell
analyses in ways that suggested a balancing test could be easily adopted in the future. 151 Instead of taking the opportunity to develop such
a test, the Fourth Circuit in White overcomplicated the Sell analysis
and seemingly contradicted its earlier decisions.152
A. Balancing Tests Are Well-Suited to Cases Where Individual and
Governmental Interests Collide Because Such Tests Recognize the
Importance of Both Interests
Ad hoc balancing tests, as opposed to definitional balancing or
categorical-style tests, are more appropriate for situations in which
courts must take notice of an individual’s particular situation and
characteristics when making their decisions. 153 Courts can still successfully apply a series of particular factors, like those outlined in Sell,
in a balancing-style test if the factors are treated as elements to be
considered rather than as sufficient conditions. 154 To apply the Sell
factors, however, most courts have employed a categorical-style test
that cannot sufficiently account for the individual’s interests. 155 Forcible medication cases in particular are well-suited to balancing tests
because of the extreme individual concerns involved. 156

148. See infra Part IV.A.1.
149. See infra Part IV.A.2.
150. See infra Part IV.B.
151. See infra Part IV.C.
152. See infra Part IV.D.
153. See infra Part IV.A.1.
154. See infra notes 176–179 and accompanying text.
155. See infra Part IV.A.1.
156. See infra Part IV.A.2.
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1. Balancing Tests May Not Produce Consistent, Predictable Results,
but Their Fact-Intensive Analysis Is Appropriate When Individual
Rights and Governmental Interests Are Concerned
This Note advocates for an ad hoc balancing test157 that focuses
on the interests at stake in a particular case, with attention to the facts
involved, and weighs those competing interests against each other to
reach a final decision. 158 It is necessary to acknowledge that courts
might be reluctant to employ ad hoc balancing tests because of their
labor-intensive nature, especially when multi-factor tests, or even definitional balancing tests, provide possible alternatives. 159 Beyond the
initial effort of applying a balancing test each time a particular issue
comes before the court, this kind of analysis also requires courts to
develop ways to weigh and measure disparate, conceptual interests
against each other. 160 In addition, because the balancing test requires
that a fact-specific analysis occur each time the interests compete, 161
the balancing test is unlikely to yield predictable results.
Balancing tests, which outline general standards that must be set
against each other, are commonly contrasted against “categorical”
type tests, which focus more on setting down rules. 162 As Professor
Kathleen M. Sullivan explains:

157. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
158. See supra Part II.A.
159. See supra Part II.A.
160. See Aleinikoff, supra note 31, at 945–46 (explaining the balancing analysis).
161. See id. at 946 (illustrating how the balancing test applies to a particular case).
162. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 293–94 (1992) [hereinafter Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging]
(explaining the difference between balancing rhetoric and categorization rhetoric); Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 375, 381–82 (2009) (explaining the difference between categoricalism and balancing in constitutional jurisprudence). Sullivan also noted that there is a subtle difference
between categorization and the establishment of a judicial rule: “A legal directive is ‘rule’like when it binds a decisionmaker to respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts,” while a categorization method creates standards instead of rules,
“allow[s] the decisionmaker to take into account all relevant factors or the totality of the
circumstances,” and permits the decision-maker to reach different results when different
facts are presented. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARV. L. REV. 22, 57–59 (1992) [hereinafter Sullivan, Rules and Standards]. “The recurring
distinction in constitutional law between ‘categorization’ and ‘balancing’ [therefore] is a
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Categorization and balancing each employ quite different
rhetoric. Categorization is the taxonomist’s style—a job of
classification and labeling. When categorical formulas operate, all the important work in litigation is done at the outset.
Once the relevant right and mode of infringement have
been described, the outcome follows, without any explicit
judicial balancing of the claimed right against the government’s justification for the infringement. Balancing is more
like grocer’s work (or Justice’s)—the judge’s job is to place
competing rights and interests on a scale and weigh them
against each other. Here the outcome is not determined at
the outset, but depends on the relative strength of a multitude of factors. These two styles have competed endlessly in
contemporary constitutional law; neither has ever entirely
eclipsed the other. 163
Each style of decision-making has advantages and disadvantages.
Those who advocate for rules and categorizations argue that such tests
promote judicial consistency, uniformity, and predictability in decision-making. 164 Categorization also prevents the effect of a judge’s
own biases from influencing his decision by structuring the decision
around clearly identified constraints. 165 By contrast, balancing tests
“spare individuals from being sacrificed on the altar of rules” by highlighting the relevant similarities and differences between parties and
cases. 166 Judges are permitted to apply flexible standards to changing
circumstances and can reach different decisions over time. 167 Balancing tests also make judges more accountable for their decisions; by
requiring judges to explain the reasons behind their substantive decisions, these tests help develop legal principles. 168
The differences between balancing tests and categorizations
“mark a continuum, not a divide,” 169 which suggests that a transition

version of the rules/standards distinction,” where balancing reflects standards and categorization reflects rules. Id. at 59–60.
163. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging, supra note 162, at 293–94.
164. Sullivan, Rules and Standards, supra note 162, at 65.
165. Alan K. Chen, The Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of Constitutional
Balancing Tests, 81 IOWA L. REV. 261, 283 (1995).
166. Sullivan, Rules and Standards, supra note 162, at 66.
167. Id.
168. Chen, supra note 165, at 283.
169. Sullivan, Rules and Standards, supra note 162, at 61.
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from a categorization test to a balancing test is not jurisprudentially
impossible. Arguably, most of the courts to address the Sell factors did
so in a categorical style, where the government’s ability to satisfy each
factor was considered enough to allow forcible medication without
any further inquiry into the individual’s interest. 170 Comparing the
benefits and problems equated with both methods, however, suggests
that categorization does not work as effectively as a balancing test
would in the realm of forcible medication. Categorization “prohibits
the reweighing of interests” once the rules are developed 171 and prevents judges from considering the particular qualities of each party in
making their decisions. 172 By definition, categorization demands that
judges treat all cases of the same type exactly alike; 173 however, forcible medication analyses have required courts to focus on the individual to be medicated and the specific course of treatment for that specific purpose. 174 Because the forcible medication analysis will conconstantly change depending on the individual’s specific diagnosis
and susceptibility to side effects, categorization’s inability to adapt to
changing circumstances is ill-suited to the task. The increased accountability of a standards-based balancing test is also necessary when
judges are charged with making decisions that affect an individual’s
mental processes and physical health. 175 In short, what would be sacrificed in terms of consistency and predictability by treating the Sell
factors as standards in an overall balancing test—instead of parts of a
categorical rule—would be countered by an increased ability to focus
on individual characteristics of the defendants and clearer judicial
explanations for why medication was permitted or denied.
The right to avoid forcible medication is an individual right important enough that courts should be compelled to undertake a balancing test, despite its difficult and nuanced application. In the past,
the Supreme Court actually rejected a bright-line rule for determining whether the government’s interests can override an individual’s
170. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 532 F.3d 538, 545 (6th Cir. 2008) (describing the
Sell factors as “a four-part analysis to be conducted by the district court when determining
whether involuntary medication may be utilized to render a defendant competent to stand
trial”).
171. Blocher, supra note 162, at 382.
172. Sullivan, Rules and Standards, supra note 162, at 62.
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 241 (4th Cir. 2005) (requiring courts
to consider defendants facing forcible medication on an individualized basis).
175. See infra Part IV.A.2.
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constitutional rights in favor of a more flexible balancing test. 176 In
Barker v. Wingo, 177 the Court developed an ad hoc balancing test that
applied in situations where the individual right to a speedy trial under
the Sixth Amendment was allegedly violated, and in doing so, outlined four factors for a court to consider in determining whether the
individual had been deprived of his right. 178 The Court noted:
We regard none of the four factors identified above as either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a
deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such
other circumstances as may be relevant. In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in
a difficult and sensitive balancing process. 179
The same analysis and reasoning could easily be applied to the
four Sell factors and to the individual right to be free from forcible
medication with antipsychotic drugs. Such an interpretation of the
Sell factors would help courts compare the individual and governmental interests at stake in a forcible medication case without reducing
the inquiry to a mere checklist of steps the government must fulfill
before medication will be allowed.
2. A Balancing Test is Particularly Appropriate in the Context of
Forcible Medication
It is well-settled law that the individual’s interest in liberty, including the liberty to treat his body how he wishes in the medical context, is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 180 The right to choose medical treatment, or to avoid
treatment altogether, is so critical because it can affect an individual’s
very existence. 181 This liberty interest becomes especially important in

176. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529–30 (1972).
177. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
178. Id. at 530. The four factors identified by the Court were the length of the delay
before the trial began, the government’s reasons for the delay, the defendant’s personal
responsibility to assert his Sixth Amendment right, and any prejudice to the defendant resulting from delay. Id. at 530–32.
179. Id. at 533 (citation omitted).
180. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (affirming
the Fourteenth Amendment right to refuse unwanted medical treatment).
181. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663–64 (N.J. 1976), overruled by In re Conroy, 486
A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985) (recognizing that an individual might knowingly choose to discon-
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the forcible medication context, because unwanted treatment with
antipsychotic drugs is designed to have a profound effect on the individual’s physiology without affording the individual the right to
choose that effect on his own. 182 The purpose of antipsychotic medication is “to alter the chemical balance in a patient’s brain, leading to
changes . . . in his or her cognitive processes.” 183 Besides fundamentally altering an individual’s brain chemistry, these drugs can also
cause a variety of side effects, ranging from the (comparatively benign) risks of elevated body weight and cholesterol levels 184 to the
risks of irreversible muscle twitches (tardive dyskinesia) and possible
death from cardiac malfunction (as a result of neuroleptic malignant
syndrome). 185
These are severe effects, intended and potential, for any individual to face, but the individual who wishes to take these medications
voluntarily has at least made his own choice in the context of his own
liberty interest in his own body. Before imposing these effects on an
individual who did not wish to take antipsychotic medication at all,
the law should require the government to make an extremely strong
case demonstrating why it could not yield to the individual’s liberty
interest in keeping his own body and mind free from such fundamental changes. 186 An ad hoc balancing test that places the government’s
specific interest in trying a specific defendant against that defendant’s
interest in being free from a specific antipsychotic medical regimen,
including an analysis of the potential side effects that individual might
face, would give the necessary respect and deference to the individu-

tinue medication, even if that choice meant hastening her own death, and finding that the
right to privacy would protect such an informed choice).
182. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229–30 (1990) (describing the potential
effects of antipsychotic medication).
183. Id. at 229.
184. See United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401, 408 (4th Cir. 2010) (describing some potential effects of second-generation antipsychotics).
185. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 230 (describing potential, although rare, side effects of antipsychotic medications in general).
186. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134–35 (1992) (describing some of the possible
serious side effects of antipsychotics and emphasizing that forcing such drugs onto an individual absent “overriding justification” is unconstitutional).
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al’s compelling interest, while allowing the government to prevail in
certain rare cases. 187
B. Sell and its Predecessors Never Explicitly Ruled Out a Balancing Test,
and the Structure of the Sell Factors Could Lend Itself to a Balancing
Format with Little Difficulty
The Supreme Court cases before Sell that addressed forcible
medication suggested that a balancing-style test could be appropriately applied to contrast individual rights against government interests.188
Furthermore, nothing in the language of Sell indicated that the Court
would have disapproved of a balancing test to implement its four factors. 189 The Sell factors as they stand now could be modified to fit a
balancing-style test, which would more effectively consider the government’s interest in prosecuting crime and the individual’s liberty
interest in avoiding forcible medication. 190
1. Harper and Riggins Established the Importance of the Individual
and Government Interests, and Required That Courts Consider
Both in the Forcible Medication Analysis
The Supreme Court in Sell explicitly looked to Harper and Riggins
as “set[ting] forth the framework for determining the legal answer” to
whether an individual awaiting trial could be forcibly medicated. 191
Both cases characterized the individual’s interest in avoiding forced
administration of medication as a constitutionally protected liberty
interest. 192 Specifically, the Court in Harper classified that liberty in187. Such a test would also respect the mandate in Sell that forcible medication for the
purposes of rendering a defendant competent to stand trial ought to be allowed only in
“rare” instances. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003).
188. See infra Part IV.B.1.
189. See infra Part IV.B.2.
190. See infra Part IV.B.3.
191. Sell, 539 U.S. at 178–79.
192. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134 (1992); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,
221–22 (1990). The Sell Court accepted this constitutional liberty interest without specifying which amendment was implicated in the forcible medication analysis. Sell, 539 U.S. at
179. In contrast, both Harper and Riggins grounded that right in the Fourteenth Amendment. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 134; Harper, 494 U.S. at 221–22. The liberty protections offered
to an individual under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process Clauses, however, are equivalent, suggesting that the Sell Court could discuss the individual’s constitutional liberty right in avoiding forcible medication without grounding it specifically in ei-
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terest as “significant,” and it had to be evaluated against “both the legitimacy and the importance of the governmental interest presented . . . .” 193 The Riggins Court instead required a finding of an “essential state policy” or an “overriding justification” before forcible
medication could be considered; without such a finding, forcible
medication would be an “impermissible” infringement on individual
liberty. 194 Although neither Harper nor Riggins explicitly called for
balancing the individual and governmental interests, the characterization of the individual’s liberty interest as “significant” and as standing
in opposition to the government’s interest set out the issue in a balancing-appropriate format. Furthermore, the Court in Riggins found
that the state courts had committed reversible error because they “did
not acknowledge the defendant’s liberty interest in freedom from
unwanted antipsychotic drugs” before allowing forcible medication,
implying that both the individual’s interest and the government’s interests must be evaluated concurrently in such situations. 195
2. Sell Suggested That Individual Liberty Must Remain an
Important Consideration in Forcible Medication Cases, and
Further Indicated That Courts Could Use the Four Factors in a
Balancing-Style Test
The Sell Court, before setting out the standard for forcible medication of a defendant who has yet to stand trial, explicitly reiterated
both the individual liberty interest set forth in Harper and Riggins and
the need for the government to show a very significant interest of its
own before being allowed to medicate. 196 Thus, the Court made clear
at the outset that both sets of interests would need to be considered in

ther the state or the federal realm. See John F. Basiak, Jr., The Roberts Court and the Future of
Substantive Due Process: The Demise of “Split-the-Difference” Jurisprudence?, 28 WHITTIER L. REV.
861, 866 & n.34 (2007) (explaining that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process Clauses offer identical liberty protections).
193. Harper, 494 U.S. at 221, 225.
194. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135, 138.
195. Id. at 135–37. Indeed, the Riggins Court reversed because the lower state courts
did not make sufficient findings, including the finding that the state interest overrode
Riggins’s liberty interest, to justify forced medication. Id. at 129, 138.
196. Sell, 539 U.S. at 178–79. In its recapitulation of Harper and Riggins, the Court variously characterized the government’s level of interest as “legitimate,” “important,” “essential,” and “overriding.” Id.
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the forcible medication analysis it was about to undertake. 197 Additionally, although the Court introduced the Sell factors by stating that
the Constitution permits forcible medication “only if the treatment is
medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects . . .
and . . . is necessary significantly to further important governmental
trial-related interests,” 198 it never suggested that the satisfaction of
those four factors was all that was required before forcible medication
would be allowed. On the contrary, viewing the satisfaction of the
four Sell factors as the only roadblock to forcible medication works
against the Court’s statement that “those instances [when medication
is ordered] may be rare.” 199
Instead, the four Sell factors outlined by the Court were designed
to help lower courts decide whether “the Government, in light of the
efficacy, the side effects, the possible alternatives, and the medical appropriateness of a particular course of antipsychotic drug treatment,
[has] shown a need for that treatment sufficiently important to overcome the individual’s protected interest in refusing it[.]” 200 Based on
this description of the purpose of the four factors, it appears that they
were designed to help a court determine whether the government
had satisfied its side of the constitutional balance and had demonstrated a significant interest in forcible medication. 201 As the factors
were designed to “help” this determination, and not to prove it, the
Sell Court never indicated that the four factors were all that had to be
shown to allow forcible medication. 202 Because the Court did not
choose to set out the four Sell factors as a standard to be met and
overcome, therefore allowing medication once all four factors were

197. Id. at 179. The Court made a point to discuss the failure of the state courts in Riggins to consider the individual’s liberty interest before ordering Riggins’s forced medication, indicating that such an omission in an analysis of forcible medication to regain competence to stand trial was a very serious error. Id.
198. Id. (emphasis added).
199. Id. at 180 (emphasis added).
200. Id. at 183 (emphasis added).
201. Cf. id. at 181 (“We emphasize that the court applying these standards is seeking to
determine whether involuntary administration of drugs is necessary significantly to further
a particular governmental interest, namely, the interest in rendering the defendant competent to stand trial.”) (emphasis omitted).
202. See id. at 183 (“[T]he factors . . . should help [a court] make the ultimate constitutionally required judgment.”) (emphasis added).
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shown, 203 the possibility remains that the four factors could instead be
applied as a part of a balancing test.
3. Courts Could Apply the Sell Factors in a Balancing Format
Without Changing the Factors or the Rationale Behind the
Decision
The structure and content of the four Sell factors, as originally set
out by the Supreme Court, actually forces courts to consider the governmental and individual interests side by side; 204 thus, shifting the
factors into a balancing test would require very little in the way of substantive change. The first Sell factor, in fact, explicitly addresses the
government’s need to have “important” interests at stake in prosecuting the charged individual. 205 This important governmental interest
represents one half of the proposed ad hoc balancing test, and would
be bolstered by individualized findings in support of the effectiveness
of the proposed treatment. The other half of the test would call for a
detailed analysis of the individual’s interests in not being forcibly
medicated and would consider, in part, other treatments that might
be available, the possibility for civil commitment, and the side effects
that antipsychotic drugs might cause. These concerns already exist in
the remaining Sell factors. 206 A balancing-style test would subsume the
second, third, and fourth Sell factors into the overall interests at stake
on each side, perhaps giving weight to either the individual or the
government, but not by themselves sufficient to allow forcible medication.
For example, courts performing a Sell analysis already require the
government to identify specific drugs in specific dosages and to plan
for possible side effects the individual might experience. 207 The government must also tailor its arguments in favor of prosecution to the

203. See id. at 180 (stating that the instances where medication is allowed will be “rare”).
204. See id. (noting that the four-factor analysis requires courts to “consider the facts of
the individual case in evaluating the Government’s interest in prosecution”).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 180–81 (explaining the possible special circumstances that may lessen the
government’s interest, the necessity of medication, and the medical appropriateness of
medication).
207. See supra Part II.C.2.
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crimes for which the individual has been charged. 208 A balancing test
would still require courts to consider the same factors, but would consider them standards rather than “necessary or sufficient condition[s]” for depriving an individual of his liberty interest. 209 The balancing test format would also allow those individualized findings to
support either side of the scale: If the government, for example, has
not identified which antipsychotic medications it plans to use to treat
the defendant, the absence of that finding would bolster the individual’s assertion that the government does not have a strong enough argument to outweigh his interest in remaining free from forcible medication. If the treatment plan is highly individualized, however, the
individual could still introduce evidence of special circumstances that
argue against his medication. The last three Sell factors could therefore be considered a kind of safeguard: without them the government
cannot demonstrate an interest strong enough to overcome the individual’s liberty right, but the existence of those factors does not guarantee that the government’s argument will prevail. 210
The standards of review the lower courts have given this particular factor also support transforming the first Sell factor into one half of
a constitutional balancing test. The first Sell factor is unique in that it
is reviewed de novo, as a legal finding, in every circuit that has addressed Sell-type cases. 211 The other three factors are considered factual in nature, except in the Tenth Circuit where only the third and
fourth factors are reviewed as factual. 212 Because the last three factors
208. Cf. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180 (discussing how the government has an important interest
in prosecuting serious crimes, but the facts of the individual case will affect that prosecutorial interest).
209. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972) (stating that the four factors for determining whether the right to a speedy trial was violated were not “necessary or sufficient
condition[s]”).
210. Cf. id. (noting that the four factors outlined in the Court’s decision were merely
related, not “talismanic,” and “must be considered together with such other circumstances
as may be relevant”).
211. See supra Part II.C.1. The Tenth Circuit is unique in treating both the first and second factors de novo. United States v. Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107, 1113–14 & n.12 (10th Cir.
2005). The other eight circuits to address Sell have not followed the Tenth Circuit’s lead,
even when some of them addressed the Sell factors as a matter of first impression and had
the Tenth Circuit’s approach available for guidance. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 630
F.3d 1314, 1331 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 128 (2011) (citing Bradley but disagreeing with it and choosing to follow the other circuits to address the Sell factors).
212. See supra Part II.C.1.
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are reviewed as factual, courts could conceivably resolve them differently in every forcible medication case, where different facts would
present each time. The consistent review of the governmental interest factor as a legal conclusion, however, suggests that this interest is
either present or absent in every case. The willingness of the appellate courts to consider the first Sell factor legally and the last three factors factually provides further support for the contention that the forcible medication analysis should be applied in an individualized
balancing test, where the ultimate goal is to prove that the government has an interest sufficiently strong to overcome the individual’s
constitutional liberty interest in avoiding forced medication.
C. Circuit Courts of Appeals, Including the Fourth Circuit,Have Taken
Steps Toward a Balancing Test, Suggesting That a Balancing
Approach Would Not Be Difficult to Implement
Although courts that performed Sell analyses did not explicitly
adopt a balancing test format, they considered the four factors in such
a way that balancing was either referenced outright 213 or was implicitly
supported by the way the factors were discussed. 214 Other courts
compared their current cases to other forcible medication decisions
from other circuits and drew distinctions between the cases, another
indication that balancing-style methods were implicitly adopted. 215
These practices suggest that courts could easily convert the Sell analysis into a balancing test without adversely affecting the way decisions
are made.
The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit that has explicitly refused to
apply the Sell analysis as a balancing test. In United States v. RuizGaxiola, the Ninth Circuit found that “[t]he Sell factors do not represent a balancing test, but a set of independent requirements, each of
which must be found to be true before the forcible administration of
psychotropic drugs may be considered constitutionally permissible.” 216
The court, however, did not have an independent, precedential basis
for this statement and instead reached its conclusion that the four factors act as mere barriers to overcome based on a textual reading of

213. See infra notes 219–223 and accompanying text.
214. See infra notes 227–228 and accompanying text.
215. See infra notes 224–228 and accompanying text.
216. 623 F.3d 684, 691 (9th Cir. 2010).
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Sell. 217 No other circuit court has reached this conclusion, making the
Ninth Circuit an outlier court in this respect in the same way the
Tenth Circuit is an outlier court in its standard of review of the second Sell factor. 218
On the other end of the spectrum, the Third Circuit arguably attempted to apply the Sell factors in a balancing test format in United
States v. Grape. 219 Grape involved a challenge to the government’s satisfaction of the first and second Sell factors: whether the government
had demonstrated a sufficiently important interest to justify medication and whether that medication was substantially likely to restore
Grape to competence. 220 Although the Third Circuit recognized that
217. See United States v. Hernandez-Vasquez, 513 F.3d 908, 913 (9th Cir. 2008) (phrasing the Sell factors as findings the trial court must make before allowing medication); see
also Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d at, 691 (citing the Hernandez-Vasquez Court’s listing of the Sell
factors for the proposition that the factors should not be applied as a balancing test but
should instead be seen as “a set of independent requirements”).
218. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
219. 549 F.3d 591 (3d Cir. 2008). John Douglas Grape, diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, was charged with the receipt and possession of child pornography. Id. at 592–
93. The Third Circuit affirmed the order from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania granting the government’s motion to allow forcible medication. Id. The Third Circuit also reviewed one other district court decision relating to
the Sell factors, United States v. Muhammad, 398 F. App’x 848 (3d Cir. 2010). Muhammad,
however, yielded no additional discussion as to how the Third Circuit would apply the Sell
factors, and the court simply stated that its analysis was limited “to the narrow question of
whether the [district court] properly applied the four Sell factors. We have reviewed the
record and we are satisfied that the Court's opinion responded to the contentions Muhammad has made before us. We will affirm its judgment without further discussion.” Id.
at 849–50.
220. Grape, 549 F.3d at 592. The Third Circuit dismissed Grape’s arguments as to the
second Sell factor on factual grounds. Id. at 604. Grape had actually been forcibly medicated by the time of his appeal for the safety reasons set out in Harper. Id. at 592–93. Because that forcible medication restored Grape to competency in the past, the Third Circuit
disposed of the issue of whether forcible medication was substantially likely to restore
Grape to competence. Id. at 604. The court, however, did take note of “the research and
scientific and empirical evidence the parties debated regarding the likelihood that antipsychotic medications would restore Grape to competency.” Id. at 605 (citation omitted).
That evidence included the identification of a specific drug, an outline of a dosage regimen, and contingencies for dealing with identified potential side effects—all of which
would have appeared to satisfy the criteria set out in Evans, although the Third Circuit did
not expressly mention Evans in its analysis. Id. at 595–96.
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Grape made a convincing argument about the possibility of his civil
commitment that might work against the government’s interest in
bringing him to trial, it stated that “we must balance Grape’s strong argument against the Government’s interests.” 221 As a result of this balancing, the court found that “Grape’s arguments do not outweigh the
Government’s. Therefore, the Government’s interest is sufficiently
strong to outweigh Grape’s liberty interest and to meet [the first factor] of the Sell test.” 222 The use of balancing test language and the
court’s explicit recognition of the defendant’s individualized arguments—in particular, the possibility that Grape could be committed
as opposed to tried in court—indicate that the restructuring of the
Sell test as a balancing analysis would not be fundamentally different
from some of the analyses in which lower courts have already engaged. 223
The Eighth Circuit undertook a balancing-style analysis in the Sell
arena as well, although it did not use balancing language explicitly.
One of the benefits of a balancing test is that it allows courts to compare the “relevant similarities and differences” between cases that are
substantively alike. 224 In United States v. Nicklas, 225 the Eighth Circuit
spent a portion of its forcible medication analysis drawing comparisons and distinctions between Nicklas’s case and the Fourth Circuit’s
decision in White. 226 The fact that both cases raised the same substan221. Id. at 600, 602 (emphasis added).
222. Id. at 603 (emphasis added). The Third Circuit found that governmental interests
outweighed Grape’s individual liberty interest based specifically on Grape’s status as a repeat offender, the opportunity for supervised release that would come with a potential
conviction, and the fact that Grape would still be required to serve the majority of any sentence imposed on him. Id. at 602.
223. Perhaps taking notice of the fact that Sell was not explicitly set out as a balancing
test, the Third Circuit also noted that the four factors as a whole made up “a standard that
the government must meet in order to overcome the inmate’s liberty interest.” Id. at 599.
The crux of the Third Circuit’s opinion, however, was that the government’s interest—the
first Sell factor—could overcome Grape’s arguments against medication, suggesting that
the court tacitly adopted a balancing format. Id. at 603.
224. Sullivan, Rules and Standards, supra note 162, at 66.
225. 623 F.3d 1175 (8th Cir. 2010) cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 124 (2011).
226. Id. at 1179–80. In affirming the government’s motion to forcibly medicate Nicklas,
the Eighth Circuit compared the time Nicklas spent in pretrial custody to the time White
served, Nicklas’ propensity to be a repeat offender to the lack of evidence that White
would commit similar crimes, and the violent nature of Nicklas’s crime to the nonviolent
nature of White’s. Id.

2012]

UNITED STATES V. WHITE

289

tive issue of whether the defendant could be forcibly medicated to
render him competent, and that the court relied on factual distinctions between its own case and earlier cases to help make its decision,
provides support for the argument that a balancing test that takes
note of individualized distinctions could be applied effectively in a Sell
analysis.
The Fourth Circuit itself discussed the application of the Sell factors in a way that would lend itself to a balancing test. Evans and Bush
discussed the second and fourth Sell factors as one single unit, not as
two separate elements that exist independently of one another. 227
The Evans court, in particular, made no effort to separate the second
“significantly further” factor from the fourth “medically appropriate”
factor and required the government to provide individualized findings before satisfying either. 228 If the court had considered each factor as an element to be proven individually before medication would
be allowed, it would not have combined two of those four factors into
one determination. Because the Fourth Circuit already adopted a
forcible medication analysis that addresses two of the three factual
factors as one unit, it would be a simple and logical step to consider
the last three factors together, as part of the overall determination of
whether the government has expressed an interest important enough
to overcome the individual’s constitutional rights.
D. Instead of Adopting a Conjectural Approach That Rendered the Sell
Factors Increasingly Unwieldy, the Fourth Circuit in White Should
Have Taken the Opportunity to Apply the Sell Factors in a
Constitutionally Appropriate Balancing Test
In White, the Fourth Circuit went beyond further defining the
four Sell factors and entered the realm of conjecture when it conducted its own sentencing analysis for White before she ever stood trial. 229
This sentencing calculation confused the court’s analysis and led it to
focus on issues that were not relevant to the individualized focus ad227. See United States v. Bush, 585 F.3d 806, 815–17 (4th Cir. 2009) (discussing the second and fourth Sell factors under their own headings, but citing to the Evans requirement
that the second and fourth factors be shown by an individualized plan); United States v.
Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 240–42 (4th Cir. 2005) (discussing the second and fourth Sell factors
under the same heading and repeatedly referring to both factors together).
228. Evans, 404 F.3d at 240–41.
229. See supra Part III; see also United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401, 424 (4th Cir. 2010)
(Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority’s sentencing calculation was based on
“rank speculation”).
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vocated in its earlier decisions. 230 Instead of creating this complicated
calculation, the Fourth Circuit should have used White as an opportunity to develop, and explicitly adopt, a balancing test that would
have properly weighed White’s constitutional liberty interests against
the government’s interest in prosecution. 231
1. The Majority’s Decision in White Renders the Application of the
Sell Factors Increasingly Unwieldy and Overly Conjectural
As a result of the majority’s decision in White, courts in the
Fourth Circuit may face the daunting and unwieldy task of calculating
a defendant’s potential sentence when deciding whether to grant the
government’s motion for forcible medication of mentally incompetent defendants. The Supreme Court did not contemplate this kind
of analysis in Sell, and, until White, it had not been undertaken by the
Fourth Circuit or the other circuit courts. Admittedly, the Sell analysis
is fact-intensive by design, and therefore the results cannot be entirely
predictable. 232 The Fourth Circuit’s analysis of the first Sell factor, and
its attendant special circumstances, however, went beyond an individualized analysis. By attempting to calculate both White’s time served
and her potential sentence if convicted, 233 the court turned an analysis that in the past had focused on a defendant’s possible individual
reactions to antipsychotic medications into highly conjectural guesswork not conceived by the Supreme Court. 234
The court’s decision to “calculate White’s time served, her likely
sentence, and then ask whether the former is significant in light of
the latter” 235 is directly contrary to the Fourth Circuit’s prior decisions
in Evans and Bush, where sentencing guidelines were not analyzed

230. See infra Part IV.D.1.
231. See infra Part IV.D.2.
232. Cf. Evans, 404 F.3d at 241 (criticizing the lower court for accepting a report that
did not analyze Evans as an individual and did not take note of his particular physiology
before approving the government’s forcible medication plan, and noting that to accept
generic plans “would be to find the government necessarily meets its burden in every case
[in which] it wishes to use . . . antipsychotic medication”).
233. White, 620 F.3d at 414–17 (majority opinion).
234. See id. at 424, 429 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s focus on
sentencing “create[d] new standards and a new process without legal support and relie[d]
on gross speculation” and that a faithful application of the Sell factors would have supported forcible medication).
235. Id. at 414 (majority opinion).
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and the maximum statutory penalty was sufficient to establish that a
serious crime was committed. 236 Indeed, the Evans court specifically
considered such a focus on potential sentence calculation as both
“unworkable” and “uniquely inappropriate” in the context of a Sell
analysis. 237 The Bush court was equally clear about the potential effect
of time served as a special circumstance, stating that time served in an
amount long enough to cover a potential sentence did not, by itself,
defeat the government’s interest. 238 In addition to circumventing earlier Fourth Circuit decisions, this focus on calculating White’s potential sentence created a new step in the Sell analysis that no other circuit had adopted: The Fourth Circuit appears to be the only circuit
court that has attempted such a sentencing calculation in determining whether the government established an important interest in
prosecuting. 239
The majority in White also moved the Sell analysis further away
from the fact-specific and individually focused analysis recommended
by Sell 240 and by other courts 241 by considering both the sentence of
White’s co-defendant and the median and mean sentences imposed
236. See United States v. Bush, 585 F.3d 806, 814–15 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting Bush’s possible sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines but not relying on that figure for any sort
of analysis); Evans, 404 F.3d at 237 (disagreeing with Evans’s claim that the Sentencing
Guidelines were the appropriate focus in determining the seriousness of the charges
against him).
237. Evans, 404 F.3d at 237–38. The Evans court considered a sentencing guideline
range unworkable because it would require an appellate court to calculate a probable sentencing range in the absence of the factual findings contained in a presentence report
(“PSR”), which was typically prepared:
pursuant to testimony presented at trial or the plea and a detailed investigation
of the defendant. A focus on the probable guideline range as the barometer of
seriousness would shift this fact-finding to a time before the defendant’s trial or
plea, before the Probation Office prepares its report, and at a time when the district court has already ruled that the defendant himself is incompetent.
Id. at 238.
238. Bush, 585 F.3d at 815. Bush argued that the Sentencing Guidelines called for a
sentence ranging from twenty-four to thirty months, and that she had been in confinement for eighteen months at the time of her appeal. Id. at 814.
239. See White, 620 F.3d at 428 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the attempt to calculate White’s possible sentence was “unprecedented and unsupportable”).
240. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003).
241. See, e.g., Evans, 404 F.3d at 240–41 (stating multiple times that the government
should have analyzed Evans “as an individual”).
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nationally for similar crimes. 242 The majority even admitted that this
sentencing analogy between White and her codefendant, Baker, was
“imperfect; Baker pled guilty to only three counts (White [wa]s
charged in six) and, unlike White, Baker provided substantial assistance to law enforcement.” 243 Indeed, this approach of looking to
median sentences and sentences imposed on other defendants removed the element of individuality from the Sell analysis calculus because these sentencing considerations were an attempt to force White
into compliance with preexisting sentences as opposed to focusing on
her individual characteristics and considerations. 244 Most distressing
of all, perhaps, is the fact that the White majority’s attempt to calculate
White’s possible sentence before a trial had even taken place led the
Fourth Circuit into an area of law where it was “totally without legal
support,” given that courts of appeals “cannot conduct sentencings.” 245 Introducing this sentencing analysis into the examination of the governmental interest factor convoluted the Fourth Circuit’s existing Sell analysis, which had been fairly well defined. 246
2. The Fourth Circuit in White Missed an Opportunity to Apply the
Sell Factors as a Constitutionally Appropriate Balancing-Test
By the time White was decided, the Fourth Circuit had defined
nearly all the other elements of the Sell factors that had proved confusing: what constituted a serious crime, 247 whether medication was
medically appropriate, 248 how to measure whether medication would

242. White, 620 F.3d at 415–16 (majority opinion).
243. Id. at 416 n.16.
244. See id. at 415 (noting that the majority was attempting to calculate a sentence for
White that would fit into a scheme of “uniformity [of] sentencing” among “similarly situated defendants”). As the dissent in White and the majority in Evans note, however, sentencing is inherently an individualized calculation, and any attempt to base a hypothetical sentence solely off the Sentencing Guidelines or on sentences of “dissimilar” co-offenders
destroys that individuality. See White, 620 F.3d at 428 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (discussing
the individual analysis of White that would be required in sentencing); see also Evans, 404
F.3d at 238 (noting that sentencing requires a Presentence Report that includes a detailed
investigation of the individual defendant).
245. White, 620 F.3d at 429.
246. See supra Part II.C.2.
247. Evans, 404 F.3d at 238.
248. Id. at 240.
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significantly further the government’s interest in prosecution 249 and
what standard of proof and standard of review an appellate court
should apply. 250 In short, the court—and the government—were
aware of what needed to be shown to overcome the individual’s interest in not being forcibly medicated. In using the opportunity to apply
the Sell factors in a balancing format, the Fourth Circuit could have
given the appropriate respect to the individual’s strong interest in not
being forcibly medicated and continued to set itself apart as a leader
in forcible medication cases. Instead, the court shied away from this
individualized analysis and turned the Sell inquiry into a conjectural,
unwieldy, and speculative exercise. Not only would a balancing test
have been the more appropriate choice, it would have been a more
consistent choice given the Fourth Circuit’s earlier decisions. 251 In
fact, the Fourth Circuit had already laid the foundations for applying
Sell as a balancing test. Evans and Bush considered the second and
fourth factors as a unit, indicating that the appropriateness of the
medication regime could not logically be separated from the requirement that the medication significantly further the government’s
interest in prosecution. 252
Not only had the Fourth Circuit set itself up for applying a balancing test based on its earlier decisions, it also suggested in parts of
its White opinion that a balancing test could have reached the same
conclusion without having to enter the conjectural realm through its
sentencing analysis. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit outlined a list of considerations, some of which were individualized to this specific case,
supported White’s side of the balance, and undermined the government’s arguments in favor of medication. 253 These factors included
“the amount of time that [White] ha[d] spent . . . in confinement before her trial,” “the nature of the crime” White was charged with, the
list of activities White would be precluded from as a result of her admission to a mental hospital, White’s “unique medical condition,” and
whether this specific case was “exceptional.” 254 After setting out this
list of factors supporting the individual’s side of the balance, however,

249. Id. at 240–41.
250. Id. at 236, 240; United States v. Bush, 585 F.3d 806, 814 (4th Cir. 2009).
251. See supra Part IV.C.
252. See supra notes 227–228 and accompanying text.
253. United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401, 413 (4th Cir. 2010) (majority opinion).
254. Id.
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the Fourth Circuit entered into its ill-advised sentencing proceeding
and detracted all attention from any sort of balancing it employed. 255
The court’s venture into sentencing could have been avoided
had the court focused on how the four Sell factors weighed against the
government. The majority remarked that “White’s unique medical
condition lessen[ed] the government’s interest in prosecution because the proposed medical treatment has rarely, if ever, been tested
on individuals with White’s condition and thus may not rehabilitate
White . . . .” 256 This concern is reminiscent of the second and fourth
Sell factors, which Evans and Bush discussed as a unit, and is individually tailored in such a way that it would have bolstered White’s interests in not being medicated. Additionally, the Fourth Circuit spent
time addressing how White’s case was not “sufficiently exceptional to
warrant forcible medication,” 257 a consideration independent from
the four factors identified in Sell that nonetheless would have countered any government argument in favor of medication. Although
the Fourth Circuit had all the tools necessary to apply Sell as a balancing test, and although it introduced in White a new set of factors that
could be considered on the individual’s side of the balance, it failed
to actually adopting a balancing test. Instead, it complicated the Sell
analysis when it chose the sentencing path. As a result, this decision
promises to complicate future forcible medication decisions, while
moving further away from the constitutional balancing that this individual liberty interest requires.
V. CONCLUSION
In United States v. White, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit missed an opportunity to apply the four Sell factors
in a constitutionally appropriate, balancing-style test. 258 Instead, the
court made the forcible medication inquiry overly conjectural and
complicated by performing a sentencing analysis before the defendant stood trial. 259 The court’s decision in White moved the Fourth Circuit’s forcible medication jurisprudence further away from the understandings of the individual’s liberty interest in avoiding unwanted

255. See id. at 414–17 (analyzing White’s likely sentence).
256. Id. at 420; see also supra note 137 (discussing the difficulties in predicting the effect
of antipsychotic medication on White based on existing studies).
257. White, 620 F.3d at 421.
258. See supra Parts IV.B.3, D.2.
259. See supra Part IV.D.1.
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medical treatment articulated in Washington v. Harper, Riggins v. Nevada, and Sell v. United States, 260 and ignored the individualized focus it
called for in its own decisions in United States v. Evans and United States
v. Bush. 261 The Fourth Circuit would have been more faithful to the
individual and governmental interests at stake in forcible medication
cases if it had taken the opportunity to balance them against each
other. 262 Had the Fourth Circuit used a balancing test, its decision
would have comported with other circuit court decisions, including its
own, 263 and would have endorsed a style of analysis appropriate for
such an individually focused area of the law. 264 The court’s failure to
do so downplays the interests on both sides, but especially discounts
the individual’s constitutional liberty interest in being free from forcible medication. 265

260. See supra Part IV.B.1–2.
261. See supra Parts II.C.2, IV.C.
262. See supra Part IV.A.1.
263. See supra Part IV.C.
264. See supra Part IV.A.
265. See supra Part IV.A.2.

